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 From Liberal Democracy to Illiberalism 
New Authoritarian Regimes, Hungarian Illiberalism 
and the Crisis of “Real Existing Liberalism” 
 
BALÁZS BÖCSKEI 
 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
The refugee crisis of the summer of 2015 has revealed the imbalance of 
Europe and the dissimilarity of the sovereignty concepts of each state, which 
until then have mostly only been revealed by the critical literature of 
transitology1. Not only has it become clear that, as opposed to the interpretation 
of Fukuyama, “history was not over” – meaning that liberal democracy is not 
without rivals – but with the redefinition of Russian authority in the last few 
years, geopolitical realignments2 and accordingly, changes in European 
dependency relationships have started to emerge. The incompletion of history is 
enhanced which was not considered less existent by the Hungarian public 
opinion for a long time, and which underlined with the referred essay by Faared 
Zakaria in 1997: „The Rise of Illiberal Democracy” published in Foreign 
Affairs. Zakaria’s writing describes the characteristics of the illiberal 
democracies3 in an axiomatic way; however, the opening writing of the 
discourse resulted in more uncertainty than how much was unravelled by it.  
The issue has been on the agenda again particularly because of the halt 
and the backlash of the democratization processes taking place in the former 
Soviet and post-communist areas. In the same way as the concept of liberal 
democracy proves to lack homogeneity, that of illiberal democracy has been 
                                                 
1
  Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 13, 
no. 1, 2002, pp. 5-21. See also Jordan Gans-Morse, “Searching for Transitologists: 
Contemporary Theories of Post-communist Transitions and the Myth of a Dominant 
Paradigm”, Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 20, no. 4, 2004, pp. 320-349. 
2
  Robert Kagan, “Is Democracy in Decline? The Weight of Geopolitics”, Journal of 
Democracy, vol. 23, no. 1, 2015, pp. 5-10.  
3
  Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, no. 6, 1997, 
pp. 22-43. Available: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1997-11-01/rise-illiberal-
democracy. (Downloaded: 3 February 2016.) The study does not undertake to interpret the 
Hungarian political institutions within the framework of an illiberal democracy. The term 
”illiberalism” is used as a reference to the professional literature.  
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established as varying from country to country as to its meaning, as well. The 
possible heterogeneity of the concept, thus the possibility of a universal 
description of the related countries can be seen in the thematic issues of the 
Journal of Democracy, a journal comprising of the main Western supporters of 
democracy, which are to be discussed in detail later. 
The following research will in many places allude to the contents of the 
aforementioned journal related to democratization; however, when presenting 
Hungarian illiberalism, it will rely less on the terminologies of Western political 
science, instead, it will opt for the ideas of David Ost4 and Ivan Krastev5, 
interpreting the 2010 Hungarian regime change as an answer to the crisis of the 
“enlightened, rationalized liberalism”. By way of introduction, it is important to 
pinpoint: regarding Hungarian illiberalism, the emphasis is placed on its 
description within the aforementioned framework, rather than on the additional 
critical interpretations linked to the regime of Viktor Orbán that transgress the 
theoretical framework. The new post-2010 political constellation can be 
interpreted with an approach of political history and legal theory, within a 
distinct terminological (and critical) framework, but in this article, I only aspire 
to introduce a new interpretation.  
In my view, without the critical reading of waves and theories of 
democratization, characteristics related to authoritarian/populist regimes or 
hyphenated democracies6 are less intelligible: their social base, the swapping of 
the hegemonic political thinking of the post-regime change Hungary and 
responses of the regime to the substantial crisis of post-communist liberalism. 
Accordingly, this article is divided into two sections: in the first segment, the 
dilemmas surrounding democracy research and the nature of the new 
authoritarian regimes will be analysed; in the second part, the crisis of 
enlightened liberalism will be tackled. In the same section, the distinctiveness of 
Hungarian illiberalism will be investigated, then as a conclusion, the 
investigation of the post-2010 mainstream political thinking will follow.  
 
 
 Theories of Democracy and Measurement of Democracy 
 
The only thing which is even more difficult than determining (the 
variedness of) the concept of democracy is deciding on the criteria by which its 
                                                 
4
  David Ost, Defeat of Solidarity: Anger and Politics in Postcommunist Europe, Cornell 
University Press. Ithaca, NY, 2005. 
5
  Ivan Krastev, “The Strange Death of the Liberal Consensus”, Journal of Democracy, 
vol. 18, no. 4, 2007, pp. 56-63. 
6
  Wolfgang Merkel, “Embedded and Defective Democracies”, Democratization, vol. 11, 
no. 5, 2004, pp. 33-58.This approach is connected to theories of transitology and democratization, 
and focuses on the interpretation of movement between autocracy and democracy. 
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quality and power are measured. Deciding on a certain theory for an 
interpretative background will significantly affect the criteria on the basis of 
which the latter two are measured. In pursuance of the theory of egalitarian 
democracy, it is the citizens’ legal, political, as well as the possible greatest 
social and economic equality that provide identical weight to the citizens, and 
render a regime democratic7. This approach focuses on how particularly 
disadvantaged social groups are involved (in decision-making), which due to 
their structural situation, could be excluded from the several processes of 
policy-making. According to the theory of participatory democracy, not only is 
the way of the decision-making the criterion of democracy, but also to include 
the most people in the administration of matters8. The theory of participatory 
democracy does not equal the rejection of representative solutions, but it implies 
the intensification of social organizations’ access to policy-making forums. 
Mandate theory belongs to those theories which describe democracy as an 
already defined decision-making process. The latter deems it necessary for the 
parties to have programmes since the voters will select from the programmes 
offered the one standing the closest to them, thus authorizing the representative 
party to implement it. In general, citizens do not make a decision on the basis of 
this9. In accordance with the theory of accountability, they do not or are less 
likely to vote by virtue of the given programmes during elections; much rather, 
they give their opinion about the government’s efficiency, they repose their 
confidence in a (certain) party by the right of their (past) accomplishments10. 
The presupposition of the theory of minimalist democracy is that as long as 
neither running for a position, nor the right to vote are restricted, and if 
competing for power is regular, the system is to be considered a democracy. In 
addition, the theory presumes a two party system and the possibility of in-
system change of government11. Eventually, the deliberative theory of 
democracy has to be mentioned, according to which decision-making based on 
the support of the majority through voting is not satisfactory. According to this 
theory, the substance of democracy is to establish a free and public debate and 
negotiation involving the most actors possible prior to decision-making, the 
outcome of which will result in a consensus regarding policy-making12. 
Whichever theoretical direction we choose to contemplate Hungarian 
                                                 
7
  Michael Coppedge et. al, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New 
Approach”, Perspectives on Politics, vol. 9, no. 2, 2011, pp. 247-267. 
8
  Carol Pateman, Participation and Democracy Theory, Camb-Typotex, Cambridge, 1970. 
9
  Körösényi András, “A demokratikus elitizmus konszenzusán túl”, Politikatudományi 
Szemle, vol. 16, no. 4, 2007, pp. 7-28. 
10
  Ibidem. 
11
  Adam Przeworski, “Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defence”, in Ian Shapiro, 
Casiano Hacker-Cordón (eds.), Democracy’s Value, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1999, pp. 23-55. 
12
  Michael Coppedge et. al, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy…cit.”. 
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democracy, it could be described as stagnant, then as steadily declining in 
nature in the recent years. 
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), as 
well as Freedom House, regard the minimalist concept as normative, i.e. the 
formal institutional system of democracy, regarding that as an electoral 
democracy. This perception, advocated by Joseph Alois Schumpeter, is based 
on the procedural approach of democracy, viz. that it is a political system in 
which leaders gain a position by means of competition for others’ votes13. 
Schumpeter describes this in his work entitled Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy as follows:  
 
‘‘Democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or 
 refusing the men who are to rule them. But since they might decide this also in entirely 
undemocratic ways, we have had to narrow our  definition by adding a further criterion 
identifying the democratic method, viz., free competition among would-be leaders for 
the vote of the electorate”14. 
 
Based on this, post-2010 Hungarian democracy can also be described as 
deteriorating; at the same time, by 2015 the widely-referenced Freedom House has 
registered a negative shift as well. Many in the Hungarian public sphere have 
argued against the labelling of the recent state as “stagnant”, as a result of the 
changes to the institution system that have supervened, regarded by them as radical. 
Reports of Freedom House focusing on the countries of the former 
Eastern Bloc are referenced in the Hungarian public sphere. In this report15, 
Hungary was labelled as a “semi-consolidated democracy”, downgraded from 
that of “consolidated” or “substantial”. The report’s rating is as follows: the 
most efficient country (highest quality of democratic values) is marked with one 
point, the worst one (lowest quality of democratic values) with seven points. 
Hungary’s result have been constantly deteriorating in the past seven years; in 
the 2015 report, its rate was 3.18 (in 2013: 2.96; in 2014: 2.89), therefore, got 
into the same category as Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia (semi-consolidated 
category). The report has rated thirteen countries as consolidated democracies, 
six as hybrid regimes; as compared with the state of 31 December 2013, twelve 
countries have been downgraded. Further east of Hungary semi- or completely 
substantial regimes could be found. The report refers to Viktor Orbán’s speech 
in 2014, in Băile Tuşnad16, in which the Prime Minister proposed the question 
                                                 
13
  Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Routledge, London, 1994. 
14
  Ibidem, pp. 284-285. 
15
  Freedom House: Nation in Transit 2015. Available: https://freedomhouse.org/ 
report/nations-transit/nations-transit-2015#.VrJOabLhDDc. (Downloaded: 1 January 
2016.) 
16
  Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University 
and Student Camp. Available: http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-
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of illiberalism. Uniquely, the report only deals with the question in two 
paragraphs, as if the meaning and the very existence of illiberalism were evident 
by the Prime Minister’s allusion. According to the latest, 2016 report of 
Freedom House, Hungary’s aggregate rating is 3.29, which is also a 
deterioration compared to the year before. Strengthening of nationalistic and 
intolerant sentiments related to the refugee crisis was cited as a reason for the 
deterioration of the government’s democratic quality. According to the 
organisation’s justification, the government’s decisions in this field are contrary 
to international human rights practices, and undermine the democratic 
functioning of society. Another objection was the handling of the refugee crisis: 
allegedly because of the crisis, an anti-fundamental law extension regarding 
state of emergency has been implemented. The reason why perception of 
corruption is getting more unfavourable is attributed to quantitative changes 
rather than qualitative ones17.  
In addition to the methodical discussion of measurability of 
democracy18, another question can be raised: that of the absence of aspects 
which explain differences undermined through the measurement of formal 
institutions of democracy. Characteristically, criteria defined by Western 
standards19 on the one hand, fail to account for political and economic factors 
shaping the quality of democracy – despite these significantly contributing to its 
decline. On the other hand, they offer no substantive explanation as to why 
there is a constant dissatisfaction in the region related to the functioning of 
                                                                                                                       
minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-
free-university-and-student-camp. (Downloaded: 15 April 2016.) 
17
  Freedom House: Nation in Transit 2016. Available: https://freedomhouse.org/ 
report/nations-transit/2016/hungary. (Downloaded: 12 April 2016.) 
18
  Judith Kelley, Beth Simmons, “Politics by Number: Indicators as Social Pressure in 
International Relations”, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 59, no. 1, 2015, 
pp. 55-70. Sally Engle Merry, “Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights, and 
Global Governance”, Current Anthropology, vol. 52, no. 3, 2011, pp. 83-95. Problematic 
aspects of measurability of democracy include the following: definition problems, data 
selection and data aggregation.  
19
  Several indices are used in the USA and Europe to measure the rule of law, democracy 
(for example: Bertelsmann Stiftung, World Bank, World Justice Project or the above 
mentioned Freedom House). Debates revolving around indices and measurability are 
often the basis for internal (national) and external (international) fights regarding political 
interpretation. The main point of criticism towards international and civil organizations 
responsible for the creation of the index is, among others, that it is their desired political 
and economic solutions that serve as a basis of the scoring system; it is by that virtue that 
countries are preferred and rankings are set up (Kevin E. David, Benedict Kingsbury, 
Sally Engle Merry, “Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance”, International 
Law and Justice Working Papers, 2010/2. Available: http://www.iilj.org/ 
publications/documents/2010-2.Davis-Kingsbury-Merry.pdf. (Downloaded: 15 April 
2016.) 
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democracy, despite it being consolidated20. The measured democracy does not 
reflect, for example, the asynchrony existing between institutions and actors, 
neglects social-historical antecedents and conditions, and renders organicness 
and rapidness of democracy’s introduction uninterpretable. Thus, as a matter of 
fact, several factors have been left out of the analytical sphere which could have 
made the purpose of the comparative method relevant21.  
 
 
 From Transitology to the New Authoritarian States 
 
The paradigm of transitology that proved to be hegemonic in Hungary 
at the time the regime change and thereafter, did not prove to be universal 
regarding the third wave of the democratization22. The tendency of transitology 
mentioned23 has been mostly focused on the transition’s institutional aspects 
and the development of democratic institutions and less emphasis has been laid 
on examining political-economic or micro-level attitudinal changes. In 
pursuance of the statement of transitology, the concerned countries, gradually 
distancing themselves from the characteristics of a dictatorial system, are 
entering the stage of democratic transition. The latter can be divided into three 
sections: political opening, the collapse of the former regime, then the new 
one’s consolidation. The occurrence of the first independent elections is an 
important stage of this, so are the subsequent reforms. The success of transition 
is not affected by the starting positions, although the process surmises a 
functional state, thus the building of the state and that of democracy materialize 
side by side24. Every single wave has its own characteristics (stagnations, 
                                                 
20
  Pew Research Center (2011): Confidence in Democracy and Capitalism Wanes in Former 
Soviet Union. Available: http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/12/05/confidence-in-democracy 
-and-capitalism-wanes-in-former-soviet-union/1/. (Downloaded: 3 February 2016.) 
21
  Shortly before the writing of this essay, the latest ranking of a democracy index by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit has been published, in which Hungary shares its position 
with the Philippines, behind Ghana and ahead of Suriname. The index is also based on the 
combination of the above mentioned democracy theories, and is based on such categories 
as the electoral system and pluralism, the autonomy of NGOs, the functioning of the 
government, political participation and political culture. My aim with the illustration of 
the above classification of countries to same “groups” was to refer to the same uncertainty 
I mentioned in the main text in line with the measurability of democracy. Economist 
Intelligence Unit: Democracy Index 2015. Democracy in an age of anxiety. Available: 
http://www.yabiladi.com/img/content/EIU-Democracy-Index-2015.pdf. (Downloaded: 23 
February 2016.) 
22
  Samuel Huntingon, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, 
University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Oklahoma – London, 1991. 
23
  Laurence Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and Experience, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2002. 
24
  Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition…cit.”, pp. 6-9. 
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reversals), although if we regard the waves as process models (I. wave: 1828-
1926; II. wave: 1943-1962; III. wave: 1974-1995), then it can be stated that 
each of them have been followed by a relapse. But while the first and the second 
wave reveal several similarities, the third wave is unalike. Here, the idea of 
highlighting the role of the political actor is emphasised, which does not neglect 
the aspects centring on institutions either. Accordingly, the more and more 
prevalent neoinstitutionalism examines the mutual coherences between actor 
and institution. According to this theory, institutions could equally be dependent 
or independent variables. In case of the former, stabilization of democracy is 
defined by occurrence of historical traditions and social environment (habits, 
norm, moral), while in case of the latter, it is the institution’s influence on the 
actors that is determinative25. Herein, I can only allude to the fact that the 
analysis of the third wave in the neo-institutional frame would rather amount to 
the more substantial knowledge of the “reversals”, since the paradigm of the 
transitology (liberalisation, then democratization, finally, consolidation) has not 
reached its terminus. Since liberalization has provided little basis for the second 
stage (democratization), the necessity of liberal democracy being established 
from below is already questioned at this point, which again should only imply 
the correction of the methodology of comparative political science.   
As Petr Kopecký and Claus Offe draw the attention to this:  
 
 “Most researchers of democratization either come from the area of the 
comparative political science or proceed from the Latin-American or South-European 
school of transitology, hence the state’s and even more, the nation’s problems are technically 
extraneous to them”26. 
 
It should be emphasized from the aspect of Hungarian and regional 
processes: it has not been instantly recognised that the building of a state does 
not equal the building of a nation, in the same way as the emergence of 
nationalism should not be explained solely as a reaction to the end of the 
communist suppression, as the liberation of the national spirit and sentiments. 
Offe, as early as in the beginning of the nineties, drew attention to the fact that 
the East-Central European regime changes have neither historical nor 
revolutionary models, and one of the distinctive features of the sudden, 
systematic changes is precisely the complete absence of developed theoretical 
premises and the normative arguments. While the territorial integrity and 
organization of democracies following the Second World War, or of South-
                                                 
25
  Michael G. Burton, Richard Gunther, John Higley, “Introduction: Elite Tranformations 
and Democratic Regimes”, in John Higley, Richard Gunther (eds.), Elites and Democratic 
Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1992, pp. 1-38. 
26
  Petr Kopecký, Claus Offe, “Mire tanít minket a kelet-európai irodalom a 
demokratizálódásról (és viszont)?”, Politikatudományi Szemle, vol. 9, no. 3-4, 2000, p. 61. 
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European and South-American countries mostly remained unaffected – with the 
former keeping their population as well – in East-Central Europe, certain 
countries and the region were accompanied by migration, local arguments, 
national and ethnic conflicts. The other great distinction is that regarding the 
former groups of countries, processes of modernization were political and 
constitutional in nature, i.e. were related to the form of governance and the legal 
relation between state and society, whereas regarding the latter, the most 
important task proved to be the reformation of economy27. In Offe’s terms, it is 
the “dilemma of the simultaneity” the emergence of which makes East-Central 
European regime changes special. A number of issues appeared concurrently. 
Firstly, territorial questions, i.e. designation and stabilization of borders of the 
state and the population. Secondly, the question of democracy, i.e. the period 
following the era of the one-party-state, the competition for power between the 
parties in a system that is validated in a constitutionally limited way, along the 
emergence of basic civil rights. Finally, issues of ownership structure and 
economy, and political management of the production and distribution 
problems28. Thus far, it has been accepted in the professional literature that the 
new democracies of East-Central Europe represent a more mature form of the 
evolution of democracy, while countries of the post-Soviet region have turned 
in an authoritarian direction, thus are reckoned among the reversed type, 
whereas the Balkan development takes a specific intermediary form29.  
In this field, in relation to Hungary, an alternation can be perceived at 
several scientific levels already30, since Hungary is unequivocally classified 
among illiberal democracies. In the opinion of Gregorz Ekiert, as a general rule, 
economic downturn cannot serve as an exclusive explanation to the 
strengthening of illiberalism and the increase of its mobilization; much rather, 
strengthening of illiberal tendencies is warranted by an authoritarian state 
occupied by an illiberal party31. All this is strengthened by the 
institutionalization of the missing civic awareness characteristic of times after 
                                                 
27
  Claus Offe, “Demokratikusan tervezett kapitalizmus? A demokráciaelmélet szembesítése a 
kelet-közép-európai hármas átmenettel”, Szociológiai Szemle, vol. 2, no. 1, 1992, pp. 6-7. 
28
  Ibidem, p. 9.  
29
  Ágh Attila, “Demokráciakutatás a politikai és közpolitikai elemzés keresztútján: a 
demokráciák minősége és teljesítőképessége”, Politikatudományi Szemle, vol. 21, no. 2, 
2012, p. 57. 
30
  Gregorz Ekiert, “The Illiberal Challenge in Post-Communist Europe: Surprises and 
Puzzles”, Taiwan Journal of Democracy, vol. 8, no. 2, 2012, pp. 63-77; Erin K. 
Jenne, Cas Mudde, “Hungary’s Illiberal Turn: Can Outsiders Help?”, Journal of 
Democracy, vol. 23, no. 3, 2015, pp. 147-155; Krasztev Péter, Jon Van Til (eds.), The 
Hungarian Patient. Social Opposition to an Illiberal Democracy, CEU Press, Budapest – 
New York, 2015. 
31
  Gregorz Ekiert, “The Illiberal Challenge in Post-Communist Europe: Surprises and 
Puzzles”, Taiwan Journal of Democracy, vol. 8, no. 2, 2012, pp. 63-77. 
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the Hungarian regime change, the absence of civil society’s progress; while it is 
not rare, that civil society becomes polarized, and anti-liberal organizations and 
movements appear as part of them. Compared to this, Robert Kagan, 
geopolitical expert and historian of the American Brookings Institution, 
emphasizes the primacy of geopolitical aspects in the “realignment” of 
democracies, with which at the same time, rejects the concept that history has 
ended. In pursuance of his statement, the existence of the American hegemony 
has played a significant role in the democratization waves, in the same way as 
authoritarian turns do not supervene independently of the retreat of the US, of 
the increase of Russia’s and China’s power, of the strengthening of the military, 
trading and economic relations to them and the soft-pressure practices used by 
them ranging from cultural diplomacy to financing of NGOs32. 
In the same way as Freedom House’s report left the definition of 
illiberalism undefined, uncertainty can be perceived in professional literature as 
for the adequate denomination of countries in the “grey zone”33, that is, those 
not having reached a certain point by the third democratization wave, where 
transitology had supposed them to arrive at, at the time of the regime changes. 
Countries in the grey zone are usually examined through the literature of 
hyphenated democracies34, hyphenated autocracies35 or hybrid regimes36. In 
general, countries of the grey zone show numerous democratic features, such as 
“sufficient room” for the organization of parties and civil society, the existence 
of a democratic Constitution, the institution of regularly held elections, yet the 
operation of the system is full of deficits. These include the complete lack of the 
articulation of civic interest, the authority’s arbitrary, democratically 
unauthorized functioning, the lack of transparency in political decision-making, 
concentration of power, low levels of political activity and participation, the 
“collaboration” of the government and independent institutions, legitimacy of 
the elections, etc.37. 
                                                 
32
  Marc F. Plattner, “Is Democracy in Decline?”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 23, no. 1, 
2015, p. 9. 
33
  The definitional difficulty is best exemplified through the abundance of denominations in 
the literature for the grey zone countries. (pl.: semi-democracy, formal democracy, 
electoral democracy, facade democracy, pseudo-democracy, weak democracy, partial 
democracy, illiberal democracy, virtual democracy). Mikael Wigell, “Mapping 
‘Hybrid Regimes’: Regime Types and Concepts in Comparative Politics”, 
Democratization, vol. 15, no. 2, 2008, pp. 230-250. 
34
  Wolfgang Merkel, “Embedded and Defective Democracies”, cit., pp. 33-58. 
35
  Andreas Schedler, Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, 
Boulder, Colo, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006. 
36
  Mikael Wigell, “Mapping ‘Hybrid Regimes’: Regime Types and Concepts in 
Comparative Politics”, Democratization, vol. 15, no. 2, 2008, pp. 230-250. 
37
  Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition…cit.”, pp. 9-10. 
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Ivan Krastev illustrates the paradox of Putin’s regime (and that of 
authoritarian states) by the example of Russia38. According to Krastev, it is not 
through repression that “user-friendly” regimes consolidate themselves, but by 
ensuring a certain degree of freedom. In his opinion, a state organized in the 
same way as Putin’s Russia has no ideology, the idea of common weal 
presented by Putin lacks all ideological definiteness. As opposed to the practice 
of the Soviet Union, it does not try to export ideology, furthermore, people can 
retain the opportunity to leave the country39. The middle-class that is capable of 
being politically mobilized and become part of the resistance, do not hesitate to 
use this chance and go abroad – which, similarly to retreating to the virtual 
world, is a way of exit instead of protest. As Krastev alludes to the fact as well, 
leaving the country because it is not democratic, is not the same case in terms of 
its future, as voting and being involved in collective action in the order for the 
country to become democratic. Paradoxically, while the Soviet Union on 
grounds of its isolation, intensified its power, Putin’s Russia is able to conserve 
itself with the possibility of exit. Krastev sees the reason of several post-Soviet 
and post-communist “reversals” in something else: viz. that their citizens regard 
their institutions as “managed democracies”40, i.e. such institutions (for example 
the European Union) are in charge of decision-making which have not been 
elected by citizens, therefore have no mandates. They regard the European 
Union as the winning party in a dependency relationship with their country, also 
one that has its local “attendants”, so they do not experience any change through 
elections. At the same time, there shows a growth in anti-elitism and in the 
support of political forces whose interest lies in pitting the elite and the people 
against each other41. 
In Jacques Rupnik’s opinion, the reason for the stagnation of 
democratization processes is that the modernisation project within the liberal 
paradigm has been reduced to procedural democracy, and without a change of 
culture, citizens of states professing an interest in it have turned away from 
                                                 
38
  Ivan Krastev, “Paradoxes of the New Authoritarianism”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 19, 
no. 2, 2011, pp. 5-16. 
39
  Idem, Democracy Disrupted. The Politics of Global Protest, University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2014, pp. 21-23.These user-friendly attributes are present in Hungary as well: for 
the middle class, that showed inclination to become involved at demonstrations, virtual 
presence was not the only way of exit. Conservation of the regime is also reinforced if 
protesters opt for actions and ways of demonstrating that do not have winning the 
majority of population over as an aim. In recent years in Hungary, no protest was 
followed by institutionalization of the protesters, they did not form organizations, gave up 
the intention to seize power. Krastev identified this particular action as “participation 
without representation”. 
40
  Idem, “A Fraying Union”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 20, no. 4, 2012, pp. 23-30. 
41
  On the posters of the government during the campaign of the referendum aiming to reject 
the migrant quota, the following slogan appeared: „Let Brussels know”. 
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institutional democracy42. Béla Greskovits stated in 1993 that back then, 
populism did not gain ground permanently in economic policy, so the political 
regular advocacy of economic interests at the expense of others did not occur43. 
This would have meant the compensation of losers of the regime change which 
– as later will be alluded to apropos of David Ost – involved the accumulation 
of the anger of “wrathful people”, also, the strengthening of a latent base aiming 
for a political turn. Neither the recession nor the national atmosphere has 
facilitated the compensation, in addition, despite freedom of political choice 
being existent, it was subordinated to the matter of economic urgency, thus 
significantly restricted democratic competition. According to Greskovits, 
populist parties are required for a populist turn, actors displaying the antithesis 
between the elite and the people – from the early 2000s, this has been displayed 
by Fidesz (Hung.; acronym for Alliance of Young Democrats), politicizing in 
the spirit of “plebeian anti-communism”44, and have started preparing the turn 
(back). For this, it was also required that social groups disadvantaged by 
economic reforms discontinue their deferred and accumulative resistance to 
them. For this, structural, systematic and political institutional changes were 
necessary – such as the financial crisis in 2008 and the lack of leftist legitimacy 
in 2006 – at the same time, voting remained the mere act of protest against 
economic measures that also caused a social crisis45. Accepting the statement of 
Greskovits, according to which, after the regime change in the East-Central 
European region, control of economic policy and of political situations related 
to it shows exclusionary features, it can be acknowledged that indeed “dual 
democracies” have been established, “the equilibrium of which is based on the 
alliance between the state elites and a strategically important minority of the 
opposition, on the political and material compensation of that minority and on 
the extrusion of the remaining46. Populism, that had been blocked for decades, 
would result in an anti-egalitarian consensus between the post-communist and 
anti-communist counter-elites; the rise of populism would be attached to the 
crisis of post-communist liberal democracies47. 
 
                                                 
42
  Jacques Rupnik, “Is East-Central Europe Backsliding? From Democracy Fatigue to 
Populist Backlash”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 18, no. 4, 2007, pp. 17-25. 
43
  Greskovits Béla, “A gazdasági alkalmazkodás vesztesei és a kompenzáció”, Európa 
Fórum, vol. 3, no. 3, 1993, pp. 57-79. 
44
  Mike Károly, “Az antikommunizmuson túl”, Kommentár, vol. 9, no. 3, 2014. Available: 
http://www.kommentar.info.hu/iras/2014_3/az_antikommunizmuson_tul (Downloaded: 3 
September 2015.) 
45
  Greskovits Béla, “A tiltakozás és a türelem politikai gazdaságtanáról”, Külgazdaság, 
vol. 40, no. 7-8, 1996, p. 84. 
46
  Ibidem, p. 85. 
47
  Ivan Krastev, “The Strange Death of the Liberal Consensus”, Journal of Democracy, 
vol. 18, no. 4, 2007, pp. 56-63. 
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 The Crisis of “Real Existing Liberalism” 
 
Above, I have illustrated authoritarian turns based on the research of 
democracy and new authoritarian systems, explanations of which mentioned at 
the closure of the section lead to another reading, marked in the title. In the 
following, I will interpret democratic stagnations from the view of existing, 
enlightened liberal democracies, through which I will discuss the nature of 
Hungarian illiberalism. As I have already mentioned in the introduction, my 
examination of its antecedents is less focused on Viktor Orbán as a person or 
the political techniques of the right-wing, much rather, I will define it as a 
response to the paradigm of modernisation and to the crisis of “real existing 
liberalism”. Until its major defeat in 2010, buzzwords such as “rationalization”, 
“rational”, “responsibility”, “competiveness”, “stability”, “professional”, 
“West”, among others, were the terms to be commonly used by one side of 
post-regime left-liberal elites, and which were in use over several terms and 
repeatedly as descriptive terms to justify their politics; for the critics of these 
words such as “populist”, “Kádárist”, “paternalist” and ”irrational” were used 
by the other side. These descriptive categories – in line with the strengthening 
of the technocratic political perception – have filled up with normative political 
content after the regime change. Among others, as a result, the “populist” 
masses’ ability to advocate has constantly weakened, they have been 
disadvantaged in the Hungarian recognition system, their problem mapping has 
not gained legitimacy in the leftist-liberal discursive field and political thinking. 
This trend of depoliticization is based on the liberal misapprehension, framed by 
David Ost, according to which the fundament of democracy is capitalism itself, 
rather than the challenges of capitalism48. The modernized (neo)liberal 
perception of terminology and language has led to a strategy of demobilization 
and depoliticization, which resulted in such a discursive strategy, in which 
discourse in the interest and on behalf of social groups in need of the state’s 
help was considered populism. While the ideology of “modernization” as the 
decisive thought of the public policy in post-regime’s Hungary appears in 
scientific and social theory literatures as a question or as a hypothesis, in 
Hungarian public discourse, it takes the form of a statement49. Thus, the left that 
was in power until 2010 has interpreted as articulation of nationalism, populism 
and demagogy the expression and manifestation of protection of interests 
different from the one utilized within liberal discourse. Ágnes Gagyi regards 
                                                 
48
  David Ost, Defeat of Solidarity: Anger and Politics in Postcommunist Europe, Cornell 
University Press. Ithaca, NY, 2005. 
49
  Sebők Miklós, “A modernizációs konszenzus, mint a rendszerváltás ideológiája és 
közpolitikája”, in Antal Attila, Földes György (eds.), Holtpont. Társadalomkritikai 
tanulmányok Magyarország elmúlt 25 évéről, Napvilág, Budapest, 2016, pp. 46-76. 
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this as the ascetic and formal manifestation of democratic anti-populism50. All 
this can be traced in the representation of superior European values, in the 
economic policy that has been reduced to technocracy and rationalization, 
which is accompanied by the rejection of the revitalization of the welfare state. 
In his latest research, Miklós Sebők states that that “moderate-social democrat” 
and “hardcore-neoliberal” representatives of modernization, although in 
different ways, could be found around social-democrat party MSZP and liberal 
SZDSZ, although they have never been incorporated either in sociological or in 
political sense. Members of their elite group, “like a revolving door of politics 
and business”, have filled various positions, such as that of Prime Minister and 
various kinds of ministers, governmental experts and bank managers. As Miklós 
Sebők proves it, this group of neo-liberal modernization has tried to influence 
public authorities concerning public speech and ownership, in a way that lacked 
elected authority. The community of vanguards of the modernization consensus 
based on common interests and values prevailed simultaneously in the 
discursive and redistributive dimension of public policy: in public discourse and 
public policy decisions. Representatives of the consensus have supported each 
other in these two spheres. Political and intellectual public discourse have stood 
behind a redistributive and political-economic regime, while this latter has 
created the conditions for the further dominance of modernization discourses51. 
Ost, among others, used the example of the Polish Solidarity to 
illustrate how Polish liberals have lost the support of the working class52. By the 
designation “liberal”, Ost meant the former Polish community that defined 
themselves as the “democratic opposition”, who were in favour of the ideas of 
economic and political liberalism at the same time. They were convinced that 
private property and market economy are the basis of political franchises, and 
that these two can only be materialized together, that their conjunction gives the 
essence of democracy and development. In Ost’s thoughts, parties representing 
this idea were Polish Freedom Union, Hungarian Alliance of Free Democrats 
and Czech Civic Democrats Alliance. In Hungary, this group comprised of 
those sharing the political and public policy views realised by a group of reform 
economists and the democratic opposition. It is shown not only in Poland, but in 
post-2010 Hungary as well, that those not having been part of the modernization 
paradigm of the regime change, do not accept the vision of society offered them 
by the leftist-liberal elites that were the governing party for twelve years out of 
the twenty that is being examined herein. I do not interpret all this as a rebellion 
against liberalism, but as a rejection of “real existing liberalism”. This latter is a 
                                                 
50
  Gagyi Ágnes, “Az antipopulizmus mint a rendszerváltás szimbolikus eleme”, Fordulat, 
vol. 6, no. 1, 2014, pp. 298-316. 
51
  Sebők Miklós, “A modernizációs konszenzus…cit.”. 
52
  David Ost, Defeat of Solidarity: Anger and Politics in Postcommunist Europe, Cornell 
University Press. Ithaca, NY, 2005. 
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rationalist type of liberalism, which is described by Tibor Mándi in his 
summary about liberal thinking after the regime change of 1989 as follows:  
 
 “Its political preferences, were presented neither as ‘good’ nor ‘desirable’ but 
 (only) as ‘rational’ and ‘necessary’ alternatives, thus eliminating the possibility to 
 choose: voters could dismiss the government but they could not dismiss politics. So 
what we witness, in his opinion, are not majoritarian democracy and liberal 
 constitutionalism, but the conflict between populism and liberal rationalism represented 
by the European elite”53.  
 
As I mentioned, according to Ost, the liberal misapprehension stems 
from the fact that capitalism itself is considered as the fundament of democracy, 
instead of the challenges of capitalism54. This former reflective thinking 
obviously interprets every piece of criticism of capitalism or reference to the 
social expenses of market economy as an attack against democracy. The lower 
someone’s status, the more discredited, and the more one will be interpreted as 
a crowd addressed “by populism”. Thus, post-1989 Hungarian elitist political 
thinking verified rejections of demands aiming at the democratization of 
political representation and at participation, and verified existent elitist politics 
as one being the self-evident, consensual condition of the West, of Western and 
liberal democracy the normalcy of which was justified through extrinsic 
verification of the global power centre.  
The lessening of the presence of the state, depolitization of politics, 
questioning and rejection of welfare politics has led to reinterpreting the 
position of social groups most in need of state services and benefits – this 
perception – especially during the period intertwined with a legitimation crisis 
after the speech of Őszöd55 had leaked — was unable to channel and organize 
anger, resistance, criticism. In addition, through the expropriation of the 
language of rationality and necessity (cf. the reform discourse after 2006)56, 
there was no possibility for the linguistic and political representation of the 
                                                 
53
  Mándi Tibor, “Politikai gondolkodás”, in Körösényi András (ed.), A magyar politikai 
rendszer – negyedszázad után, Osiris – MTA Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont 
Politikatudományi Intézet, Budapest, 2015, pp. 13-34; Ivan Krastev, “The Strange 
Death…cit.”. 
54
  David Ost, Defeat of Solidarity: Anger and Politics in Postcommunist Europe, Cornell 
University Press. Ithaca, NY, 2005. 
55
  Speech of then-Prime Minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány, given at a private meeting, one month 
after the left won the elections. In it, not only did he argue for future reforms but also 
made reference to economic data previously pretermitted. The speech leaked on 17 
September 2006 which was followed by riots. As a result of austerity measures, 
popularity of the governing left plunged already by summer, after the leak of the speech, 
mainly down to its impact – it was obvious that the left could not win the upcoming 
elections. Ferenc Gyurcsány remains one of the most rejected politicians ever since. 
56
  The discourse of the reform aimed at the supply system was rejected not only due to its 
language but also because citizens regarded reform as austerity. 
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aforementioned social groups. They were considered by left-liberal politics not 
as a group forming according to their own identity, but as a mass of impatient 
people attuned to populism – rhetorically, the compensation of whom may be 
the aim of the government, but never in the current political period but in a 
more distant future57.  
The difference of the perceptions of politics is revealed in the political 
philosophical foundation of democracy. At the moment of the regime change 
and afterwards, Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and liberal Alliance of 
Free Democrats (SZDSZ) defined democracy mainly as institutional order, as a 
constitutional state supported by democratic institutions. In his 2003 book 
dealing with the development of Hungarian parties among others, Ervin 
Csizmadia describes in detail how Fidesz – which was at that time in opposition 
to the aforementioned parties, also to the social democratic MSZP – has aspired 
to give democracy a different ideological foundation since 199658. On the basis 
of this, on the one hand, Fidesz refused the heritage of the ideological-political 
philosophy of the 80s, the idea of the restricted revolution, since they saw it as 
the ideology of the elite’s centrist consensus, which should be exceeded. This is 
a recurring notion after 2010 as well, as the new regime interprets the upcoming 
phase as “the second regime change”. 
The substance of this “perfectionist” ideology of democracy is that the 
“limited revolution”59 was processed by the 80s elites, and so democracy must 
include, besides the rehabilitation of the notion of nation, the process of elite 
change. Thus, continuity can be perceived with regard to the right-wing 
governing after 2010 in this respect as well, because as we will see below, the 
intention of the second Orbán-government’s public law policy is, at the same 
time, the intention to suppress and terminate the era of post-communism and the 
intention to distance itself from the preceding political system. 
 
 
 “Illiberalism” after “Liberalism” 
 
The paradigm shift regarding political thinking executed by Fidesz, the 
governing party after 2010, can be described even more insightfully in the study 
of Tibor Mándi, providing an overview of the liberal political thinking of the 
post-regime change era, and by recalling András Körösényi’s statements about 
                                                 
57
  All these could be seen from statements of the Prime Minister as well as from the 
explanations by intellectuals and experts of the government at the time.   
58
  Csizmadia Ervin, A politika és az értelmiség. Pártok, agytrösztök, hálózatok, Századvég, 
Budapest, 2003, p. 86.  
59
  The expression „limited revolution” refers to a characteristic of the Hungarian regime 
change, by which continuality with the former regime remained in terms of legality 
(Kádár regime), but legitimacy was interrupted.  
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the mainstream Hungarian political thinking of 1989-1995. According to the 
latter, the features of the era’s political thinking are the following: (1) the 
normative-emancipatory concept of politics replaced the traditional concept of 
politics, which amounted to the moralizing approach of politics; (2) anti-state 
and anti-implementation attitude, criticism of the excessive power of the state; 
(3) by introducing a new dimension of separation of powers, propagation of the 
branches, radicalization of the separation of powers; (4) legal overregulation of 
politics leading – through the radicalization of the concept of the rule of law – 
to the neutralization of concepts of state and common good; (5) instead of 
political leadership, dominance of the technocratic-modernizing ideology 
favouring the “independent expert” and the “independent intellectual”; (6) 
concept of the substantive and consensus-oriented democracy (against the 
concept of the one that is procedural and based on the perception of the 
majority); (7) Finally, anti-political orientation and the myth of civil society60. 
After 2010, the right has broken away from the discourse of politics 
based on human rights as from a legal approach and with the marginalization of 
“political” and natural sense of justice. Zoltán Gábor Szűcs describes this very 
phenomenon about the question of the autonomy of politics as turning towards 
the primacy of politics – which he describes as a “realistic turn” just as much as 
he approves of calling it an “anti-liberal turn”61. Through this turn, in many cases 
there occurred a split from the transitional political thinking outlined by Körösényi. 
At the same time, according to Körösényi, examining at the level of 
Dahl’s polyarchy62, no significant rupture has occurred after 2010 compared to 
the institutional system of the regime change of 1989-1990. Hungary is 
interpreted by him as a democracy the nature of the political system of which 
has significantly changed. He calls it a regime, since there have occurred 
changes in the institutional, procedural structure as well as in content63. 
Connected to the first type of change, the adoption of a new constitution by 
Fidesz can be mentioned, that openly severs ties with numerous regulations of 
the previous Constitution. A new electoral system is implemented that is 
                                                 
60
  Mándi Tibor, “Politikai gondolkodás”, cit., p. 22. 
61
  Szűcs Zoltán Gábor, “A politika autonómiájától a politika primátusáig”, Századvég, vol. 
20, no. 1, 2015, pp. 116-117. 
62
  Robert Dahl created a list of procedural norms the realization of which is necessary to be 
able to speak of political democracy – in his use of words, polyarchy. Dahl’s seven 
conditions range from control of the government’s political decisions by the elected 
officials, also, citizens’ right to found parties and advocacy organizations (which includes 
unrestricted freedom of expression and the right of inquiry from independent sources), to 
all adult citizens’ right to political participation – including repeated and fair elections to 
eligibility. Robert A. Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy, Yale University Press, 
New Haven, 1982. 
63
  Körösényi András, “A magyar demokrácia három szakasza és az Orbán-rezsim”, in Idem 
(ed.), A magyar politikai rendszer…cit., p. 408. 
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directed towards majority over proportion, the legal system is transformed. This 
can be traced in the new structure of courts, narrowing of powers of the 
Constitutional Court – thus, strengthening of the primacy of legislature – and 
major transformation and reduction of the ombudsman system. There have been 
significant changes in the constitutional structure and in the institutions of the 
political system as well. But to call it a regime, there need to be changes in 
content too. By that, we mean mode of behaviour, style and political thinking of 
political actors. The latter can be traced in the practice of government 
politicians citing the reason of owning a supermajority (more than two-thirds of 
the mandates) when giving the rationale for their measures – claiming that they 
enjoy such degree of support from voters that they possess the authority to 
realize significant political changes. Exercise of power, therefore, has been 
greatly determined by the authority brought on by the two-thirds majority, the 
gigantic victory of the right after 2010. Consequently, governing party Fidesz 
terminated elite agreements, abandoned legal and behavioural norms from 
before 2010. This includes changing the rules of the operation and appointment 
of leaders to institutions independent of the government – for instance National 
Tax and Customs Administration, National Bank, Constitutional Court, Office 
of the Prosecutor General.  
  Körösényi names three reasons to explain why, instead of referring to a 
new system, he refers to a new regime: (1) the changes that have occurred are 
smaller than those at the time of the regime change, but bigger than 
constitutional or governmental reforms (e.g. a new Constitution has been 
adopted) (2) the alterations starting from 2010 are quite strongly attached to the 
person of the leader of Fidesz, Viktor Orbán and his style of political 
governance, and to the phenomenon of presidentialization64, (3) finally, the 
system is stable and the apparatus is durable (see the repeated two-thirds 
majority in 2014), but it is questionable how the regime can be consolidated, 
and whether it can have a future but for the person of Viktor Orbán65. Körösényi 
determines the most important features of the post-2010 regime in the 
following: conscious drawing of a dividing line between the pre-2010 period 
and the that of the founding of the regime; permanent inordinate politics and 
                                                 
64
  By presidentialization, we mean the rearrangement of the executive branch and its 
strengthening within the political system – in addition, the emphasized role of the Prime 
Minister. Another characteristic of presidentialization is that instead of party governance 
it gradually evolves into a presidential kind of governance. Independence of the Prime 
Minister – in this case, Orbán – of his party possessing the supermajority, intensifies. The 
third sign of presidentialization is competition and politics being person-oriented. Jan 
Pakulski, Körösényi András, Toward Leader Democracy, Anthem Press, London, New 
York, Delhi, 2012.  
65
  Körösényi András, “A magyar demokrácia…cit.”, p. 409. 
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authoritarian governance methods66; aiming at the creation of a central political 
sphere67; exceeding the ideology of left and right68; anti-pluralism and 
populism; statism69 and paternalism70; charismatic legitimacy, consolidation 
difficulties71, respectively72. 
In addition, the intention of the public law policy of the second Orbán-
government is effectively the intention to terminate post-communism 
ultimately73. Rightist theorists (for example András Lánczi, Gábor G. Fodor) 
closely linked to the government policy, consider the period between 1989/1990 
and 2010 to be transitory, but also describe it with the term of post-communism, 
according to which, in 1989/90, no rupture occurred, but a continuation has 
started, which can be detected between communism and contemporary post-
communism74. According to the self-interpretation to the Orbán-regime, indeed, 
there was a dividing line, between the start and endpoint of the closure of the 
transition period.  
According to the political right, post-communism is a political idea 
which means continuous crisis management, also, it is public policy-making 
perceived as technocratic managerialism – accompanied by keywords such as 
modernization, reform, progress and justice – that are the vision of assertive 
“progressive philosophy of history”75. The Orbán-government want to break not 
only with the post-communist state, but it also aims to sever the ties with the 
                                                 
66
  For example: changing the authorities of independent agencies that control the state, 
limiting access to public information, a government focusing on conflict and persecution 
of enemies, state control of civil society.  
 
67
  By central political sphere, we mean the necessity of an institutional and political situation 
where neither the left-liberal opposition not the radical right (Jobbik) stands a chance to 
defeat Fidesz.  
68
  Emphasizing national interest and Hungarian values in political communication, 
ideological mode of speech is only discernible in attacking liberalism.  
69
  After 2010, the constant presence of the state strengthens in sub-systems of economy and 
public policy.  
70
  Related to the populism represented by Fidesz, Zsolt Egyedi discusses a borderline, 
described by him as paternal populism because through it, a position is given to the state 
in the structuring of social relationships. Enyedi Zsolt, “Paternalista populizmus a Jobbik 
és Fidesz ideológiájában”, Fundamentum, vol. 19, no. 2-3, 2015, p. 50. 
71
  Constant confrontations of the Orbán regime, and its mode of exercising power results in 
the understanding of politics as permanently conflict-oriented, and in which alliances, 
whether national or international, are formed exclusively on an ad hoc basis. 
72
  Körösényi András, “A magyar demokrácia…cit.”, p. 410. 
73
  Orbán: Post-communism should be closed. Magyar Nemzet, 18 November 2011; Prime 
Minister Viktor Orbán’s year-end assessment speech, 16 February 2014.  
74
  G. Fodor Gábor, Kern Tamás, A rendszerváltás válsága – The Crisis of the Regime 
Change. Budapest, Századvég, Budapest, 2009.  
75
  Lánczi András, Molnár Attila Károly, Orbán Krisztián, Orbán Miklós, Magyar 
konzervatív töprengések a posztkommunizmus ellen, Attraktor, Máriabesnyő-Gödöllő, 
2004; G. Fodor Gábor, Fűrész Gábor, Giró-Szász András, Az ideológiák vége. A Nemzeti 
Együttműködés Rendszere, Századvég, Budapest, 2010. May. (Downloaded: 3 July 2013.) 
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legal overregulation of politics, mentioned before, and the process of 
depolitization. In addition, although citizens may evaluate government’s 
performance they are not capable to decide and act by themselves. Only the 
leader is able to do this, the monarch or the Prime Minister. Based on Tilo 
Schabert, Gábor G. Fodor, director of strategy of a government-affiliated think 
tank (Századvég76), describes the situation as follows: the political leader is, in 
fact, the monarch of the order created by chaos77. He makes governance 
possible by generating chaosmos, that is, order created by chaos, in the mode of 
creativity. Extension and invisibility are the keys of the government. The 
meaning of the former being  
 
“…anything that is related to the process of governance, certainly, the process of 
governance itself, can be  considered a potential source of power. This is the main 
and most important principle of autocracy. This strategy  requires the monarch to 
expand his political sphere in the widest way possible, and to interpret everything in 
terms of power: each event, ideal, personal issue and phenomenon the monarch touches 
becomes political through that. The principle of invisibility demands from the monarch 
– and this is one of the principles that is the most  inconsistent with principles of public 
administration and policy management – to rule their government by  mechanisms which 
are invisible to the outside world. He can fulfil this requirement most effectively if he 
maintains the state of constant confusion, incessantly exposing his ‘court’ to their 
politics of transformation and change”78. 
 
Accordingly, creative governance means to create confusion, thereby, 
uncertainty for the government. The totality of temporary configurations 
emerging from constant uncertainty is considered government. The chaos 
created by the government results in creativity, creativity controls power, and 
the monarch rules the chaos of power by building autocracy79. This role of the 
monarch is occupied by Viktor Orbán during his governance80. 
From the aspect of the issue – bearing in mind how difficult it is to 
pinpoint the essence of the Hungarian illiberal system – on the basis of 
                                                 
76
  http://szazadveg.hu/foundation?l=en 
77
  G. Fodor Gábor, Kormányzás/tudás, Századvég, Budapest, 2008, p. 51.  
78
  Ibidem.  
79
  Ibidem, p. 53.  
80
  In comparison with the other governments following the regime change of 1989, the 
recent one is the most characterized by lack of transparency to the public; despite the 
existing governmental structure, it is next to impossible for the public to decipher who the 
people in charge of political decisions and policy making are, and what authority they 
hold. Regarding both changes to the government and to personnel policy, with no 
substantial explanation provided, the public is left with guesswork. Policy of resources in 
Prime Minister Orbán’s environment, interpersonal and power relations, and decisions of 
his related to all these issues are unfathomable. This conduct displays a vastly new 
perception of technique of power: one centred on the intention to remain undisclosed to 
the public.  
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Körösényi’s statements, it has to be emphasized that authoritarian governance 
as a way of exercising power does not have the same meaning as it had before 
the establishment of the authoritarian system: Orbán has significantly changed 
the political system but the authoritarian governance (method of exercise of 
power) characteristic of the new regime has been acquired within a democratic 
system, through an authorization by the voters that can be withdrawn81. 
Körösényi is not the only one to refer to the existence of charismatic legitimacy: 
thoughts of Attila Károly Molnár based on Rousseau (Legislature in The Social 
Contract) also depict the intentions and manifestations of Orbán82. According to 
Molnár, the legislator forms a political community through evoking the feeling 
of collective pride, does not speak or persuade rationally, but converts the 
thinking of people and mobilizes them to take action. He does not speak the 
language of force or intellect, but uses the language of emotions instead83. In his 
speeches and public explanations of his policies, Orbán frequently directs his 
audience by appealing to their emotions, through mentions of Hungarian 
history, customs, traditions and values. In his utterances, he aims at the 
construction of a professed Hungarian political community; dismissing rights 
and duties, his politics is focused on a professed Hungarian experience. If we 
project this onto the pre-2010 depolitization trends, actualized on the basis of 
Rousseau and Max Weber, we will face an image of Orbán who has broken 
away from liberal consensus. To demonstrate this, a longer excerpt by Molnár 
should be quoted:  
 
 “The legislator of Rousseau and the charismatic leader of Weber both 
question the micro-legitimation of liberal democracy – according to which, 
subservience depends on the permission of the individuals – and instead 
 emphasizes the religious, non-rational nature of democracy. In fact, the charismatic 
leader can disrupt all status  quos, whatever the historical age, thus: even in modernity. 
This means that history cannot be over. But on the other  hand, the charismatic leader 
can be attached to democracy, but does not necessarily create democracy. […] Just like 
 with the case of the legislator, the charismatic leader’s impacts also come from his 
personality […]. For creating the new meaning – also, for transgressing boundaries and 
for giving things sense – courage is needed. […] Its effect is irrational due to these: 1. 
he creates a community of followers, re-integrates them, gives them new identity 2. 
mobilizes them, expects and gets extraordinary obedience (which is not understandable 
from any rational viewpoint, and so with this third step, he is able to break the status 
quo”84. 
 
                                                 
81
  Körösényi András, “A magyar demokrácia…cit.”, p. 413. 
82
  Molnár Attila Károly, “A politikus nagyszerű lelke”, Kommentár, vol. 10, no. 6, 
2015, pp. 7-19. 
83
  Ibidem, pp. 11-12. 
84
  Ibidem, pp. 14-16. 
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From all this, however, the dilemma follows: since the regime is 
strongly linked to the person of the founder and his concept of politics, it is 
questionable how lasting it can be. So far, only that much can be ascertained 
that from 2010, paradigmatic change has occurred in political thinking, the 
support of which seems stronger nowadays then critics of Orbán’s politics 
predicted before the April of 2014 or the summer of 2015.  
 
 
 Conclusion: The Existence of the Orbán-Regime 
 
There is a consensus that liberal democracy means the institutional 
limits which tame political power and the rule of law. In this regard, the pursuit 
of evading barriers and according political intentions are dominant in Hungary. 
In this sense, on the axis of liberal democracies on one end and authoritarian 
regimes on the other, Hungary has moved in the direction of the latter, but 
despite the Prime Minister’s terminology and the uncertainty resulting from the 
universality of the term, in the sense of political science, it cannot be stated that 
Hungary has arrived in the state of illiberalism.  
According to my statement, the democratization theories taken for 
granted at the time of the regime change and afterwards, are in need of being 
corrected, primarily, as a result of the widespread neglect of the political-
economic aspects. The democratization theories provide an adequate framework 
for certain institutional comparisons, but they prove to be insufficient for the 
understanding of the diversity and stagnation of the transitions. New patterns of 
exercise of power in the region strongly coincide with the absence of politics 
recognizing the social expense of transitions, and with the demand for political 
leadership and a leader. 
According to my hypothesis, requiring further research, because of the 
changes in the Hungarian institutional system and the change of the paradigm of 
political thinking; also, due to the political peculiarities after 2010, the 
institutional system conceived by critics of the Orbán regime will more likely 
be similar to that of the post-2010 version and its political conditions, then to 
the one from 1989-2010 that is in need of correction. It should also be added 
that after “the end of ideologies”, the hegemony of modernization – 
technocracy, nowadays we have again entered the age of importance of political 
sovereignty. The situation is complicated because it is not only the case of 
liberal democracies standing in opposition to authoritarian regimes, but 
imbalances between European democracies have appeared on the agenda as 
well. Illiberalism, although it is not a desirable project for after post-
communism, but in Hungary and the countries of the region, elections can be 
won by it, without short-term consequences. The key of its correction is to 
understand its current success. 
